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Today’s ride-hailing systems experienced significant growth and ride-pooling promis-
es to allow for efficient and sustainable on-demand transportation. However, effi-
cient ride-pooling requires a large pool of participating customers. To increase the
customers’ willingness for participation, we study a novel customer-centered pooling
(CCP) mechanism, accounting for individual customers’ pooling benefits. We study
the benefit of this mechanism from a customer, fleet operator, and system perspec-
tive, and compare it to existing provider-centered pooling (PCP) mechanisms. We
prove that it is individually rational and weakly dominant for a customer to partic-
ipate in CCP, but not for PCP. We substantiate this analysis with complementary
numerical studies, implementing a simulation environment based on real-world data
that allows us to assess both mechanisms’ benefit. To this end, we present results
for both pooling mechanisms and show that pooling can benefit all stakeholders
in on-demand transportation. Moreover, we analyze in which cases a CCP mecha-
nism Pareto dominates a PCP mechanism and show that a mobility service operator
would prefer CCP mechanisms over PCP mechanisms for all price segments. Si-
multaneously, CCP mechanisms reduce the overall distance driven in the system up
to 32% compared to not pooling customers. Our results provide decision support
for mobility service operators that want to implement and improve pooling mecha-
nisms as they allow us to analyze the impact of a CCP and a PCP mechanism from
a holistic perspective. Among others, we show that CCP mechanisms can lead to
a win-win situation for operators and customers while simultaneously improving
system performance and reducing emissions.

























In recent years, ride-hailing services extended the sharing economy to taxi services and expe-
rienced severe growth, especially in metropolitan areas. In the US, the number of ride-hailing
trips showed an annual growth rate of 150% between 2013 and 2018 and more than two billion
rides per year (Baltic et al., 2019). The ride-hailing sector continues its growth with a revenue
growth rate of 4.13% for the year 2019. While experts envisioned ride-hailing services to remedy
harm caused by local externalities of traffic phenomena such as congestion and noxious emis-
sions, recent dynamics revealed contrary effects. In some areas, congestion and emission levels
became even worse, not least because of induced demand from ride-hailing systems: in Manhat-
tan, the number of for-hire vehicles exploded from 47,000 vehicles in 2013 to 103,000 vehicles
in 2018, 68,000 used for ride-hailing services. During this period, a 13% drop in average traffic
speed from 6.5 mph to 4.7 mph occurred (Hu, 2017). Accordingly, today’s ride-hailing systems
face the same criticism as private transport; experts claim that, besides induced demand, low
utilization is a major obstacle.
To this end, ride-pooling concepts may allow for higher vehicle utilization. Herein, a mobility
service provider (MSP) that offers a ride-hailing service tries to match passengers whose rides
(partially) overlap and schedules them on the same vehicle. In exchange for resulting incon-
veniences, passengers receive a price discount. Ideally, passengers benefit from a discounted
transport fare while MSPs receive an increased revenue due to operational cost savings. Imple-
mented in the right way and accepted by a sufficient number of customers, such ride-pooling
services bear the potential for a win-win situation that increases utilization in today’s ride-
hailing systems.
Uber and Lyft, two of the largest ride-hailing providers worldwide, launched ride-pooling
options such as Uber Pool or Lyft Line, which yield the above mentioned win-win situation,
decreasing cost at the passenger side and increasing revenues at the mobility side, in theory.
In practice, several obstacles remain. MSPs often lose money as passengers receive a discount
for their willingness to be matched on a shared ride, independent of a successful matching
(CBI, 2020). Customers often perceive a maximum loss of comfort when selecting the pooled
ride due to inadequate but yet economically worthwhile matchings. These effects relate to
poor matchings of customer trips, mostly due to two reasons: first, the share of customers
willing to accept a pooled ride is too low to allow for constantly good matchings. Second,
existing matching mechanisms operate mostly on an economically objective, considering few
side constraints to limit the customers’ additional discomfort (cf. Alonso-Mora et al., 2017). In
such a chicken and egg dilemma, customer willingness to accept a pooling offer may decrease due
to a bad customer experience, further worsening the probability of finding a suitable matching
in a reduced customer pool.
Against this background, we study the impact of customer-centered ride-pooling. To set our
study apart from recent work, we detail the status quo and current challenges (Section 1.1),
before we review related work (Section 1.2), and state our contribution (Section 1.3), as well as
the paper’s organization (Section 1.4).
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1.1. Status Quo & Challenges
Currently, major mobility providers offer a fixed-discount tariff, i.e., provide an up-front discount
to passengers in exchange for an option to include them into a pooled ride. Each passenger who
opted to accept pooled rides receives a discount independently of being matched with another
customer in practice. In this case, the provider takes the risk of a reduced profit margin in case of
unmatched rides and chooses a provider-centered pooling (PCP) mechanism. Here, the provider
pools customers with the sole objective to maximize its profit under certain constraints. Typical
constraints that are nowadays applied in practice and studied in the literature are maximum
delays or maximum detours (Hosni et al., 2014; Ke et al., 2020).
The efficiency of matching passenger requests to pooled rides depends significantly on the
number of customer requests available in the matching. Hence, successfully sustaining pooling
systems requires win-win situations in which both the MSP and customers profit, such that
more potential customers opt for pooled rides. Current practice fosters win-lose situations
either between the MSP and the customers or in between customers: offering a fixed-discount
tariff, the MSP takes the risk of a reduced profit due to unmatched requests. Accordingly, it
stretches constraints on delay times or detours to a maximum to reduce its risk. Although
perceived as still acceptable from the MSP perspective, these boundaries may often go beyond
a customer’s bottom line for acceptable loss in comfort. Often, the customer wins a cheap
solitary ride, and the MSP loses profit, or the MSP matches customers whose losses in comfort
and time outweigh their monetary savings. Additional win-lose situations likely arise between
pooled customers: the fixed discount often does not reflect the comfort loss of both customers
as their relative detours or waiting times may differ. In total, such win-lose situations may
entail a drop instead of an increase in the customers’ willingness to volunteer in ride-pooling as
negative experiences accumulate over time. Indeed, several reports indicate that customers are
not satisfied with the “lottery” nature of the resulting mechanism (see, e.g., Morris et al., 2020;
Pratt et al., 2019).
A flexible-discount tariff that accounts for each customer’s individual preference and her con-
tribution to the pooled ride may improve the customer experience and the individual acceptance
of comfort loss. Such a customer-centered pooling (CCP) considers each customer’s value of time
in the objective and establishes a transparent and fair matching that may increase a customer’s
willingness to participate in pooling. In practice, such a mechanism can be implemented by
asking for each customer’s preference when making a trip request. For example, a drop-down
menu can be added to existing ride-pooling apps in which customers select their value of time
directly or select from a discrete set of “urgency” categories, which are then internally converted
into respective monetary values. Studying such a mechanism is the scope of this paper.
1.2. State of the Art
Our work relates to two different literature streams, ride-sharing, and ride-pooling, which we
concisely review in the following. We note that the terminology of ride-sharing and ride-pooling,
which we explicitly separate, is often used synonymously in existing works.
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Ride-Sharing: In classical ride-sharing programs, two (or more) people who plan to travel
similar routes can share a car and split the resulting cost. Here, one participant acts as a
driver and picks up and drops off other participants (riders) along her way. A central platform
matches participants for a fee but does not provide a dedicated driver to satisfy customer
requests. Early versions of ride-sharing required participants to announce their requests well in
advance (cf. Berbeglia et al., 2010), but advances in mobile internet technologies paved the way
for dynamic ride-sharing programs (cf. Furuhata et al., 2013).
Many studies focus on the technical aspects of the underlying matching mechanisms in this
field, aiming to find matchings and cost-sharing schemes for customers, considering their prefer-
ences in a two-sided matching market. Wang et al. (2017) focused on stable two-sided matchings
in dynamic ride-sharing systems, while Peng et al. (2020) focused on stable matchings, including
payment design options. Rasulkhani & Chow (2019) study a route cost assignment game to
analyze the market equilibrium. Some papers focused on fair cost allocations for ride-sharing
matchings (Wang et al., 2018; Lu & Quadrifoglio, 2019; Peng et al., 2020), but do not account
for individual customer preferences. Qian et al. (2017) focused on pricing aspects combined
with a matching problem, analyzing incentives for optimally assigning ride-sharing matches.
Moreover, some auction-based mechanisms to coordinate ride-sharing systems exist (cf. Bian &
Liu, 2019). These works mainly apply the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism to a ride-pooling
setting to maximize social welfare.
So far, none of the existing works accounts for individual customer preferences, and the
general problem setting of a ride-sharing system is only loosely related to our study. We refer
to Agatz et al. (2012); Furuhata et al. (2013), and Ho et al. (2018) for comprehensive overviews
of such (dynamic) ride-sharing systems.
Ride-Pooling: In ride-hailing, an MSP provides a dedicated driver to serve customers’ re-
quests. The MSPs can either operate a centrally coordinated fleet of vehicles and drivers (e.g.,
a taxi service) or rely on decentralized ride-sourcing (e.g., Uber, Lyft). Wang & Yang (2019)
and Feng et al. (2020) provide state-of-the-art summaries of current ride-hailing systems, the
former focusing in particular on ride-sourcing. Ride-pooling extends ride-hailing to the con-
cept o ride-sharing and allows shared vehicles to transport customers with similar routes. In
contrast to classical ride-sharing, passengers are picked up and dropped off by the dedicated
driver provided by the MSP. We refer the reader to Vazifeh et al. (2018) for a general impact
analysis of ride-hailing fleets, to Qi et al. (2018) for an overview on shared mobility in last-mile
deliveries, and to Ho et al. (2018) for a recent overview on classical and emerging dial-a-ride
problem studies.
In this field, research on ride-pooling focused mostly on optimizing vehicles’ utilization, either
by reducing the fleet size or lowering operational cost (Hosni et al., 2014; Alonso-Mora et al.,
2017). Within this domain, pricing strategies mostly capture ride-sourcing applications, simul-
taneously optimizing prices offered for non-pooled and pooled rides that maximize the MSPs
revenue (Yan et al., 2020), or focused on spatial pricing for drivers (Bimpikis et al., 2019).
Several studies addressed ride-sharing systems’ operational aspects, often from classical trans-
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portation, vehicle routing, or matching perspectives. Chen et al. (2019) analyzed a ride-sharing
system with meeting points and return restrictions, while Agussurja et al. (2019) focused on a
stochastic ride-sharing model based on a two-stage Markov decision process. Yang et al. (2020b)
analyzed the impact of matching constraints such as a detour radius, and Yang et al. (2020a)
focused on saturation effects between supply and demand in a ride-sharing system. Chen &
Wang (2018) focused on maximizing ride-pooling systems’ social welfare, optimizing vehicle
capacities, and fleet size. Long et al. (2018) studied the impact of uncertain travel times on
matchings in ride-pooling systems.
To the best of our knowledge, no study exists that focuses on general customer-centered
online-matching mechanisms that account for individual customer cost functions and incor-
porate each customer’s inconvenience to allow for fair matchings and cost allocations in a
ride-pooling system.
1.3. Contribution
We introduce the first study that evaluates the economic potential of CCP mechanisms for
ride-hailing fleets based on a formal analysis of the discussed mechanisms and a detailed nu-
merical study to evaluate their operational impact. We propose a CCP mechanism that can be
implemented in practice by asking for a each customer’s preference when making a trip request
and allows for a fair matching in ride-pooling systems: customers receive a fair cost and dis-
count allocation, reflecting each customer’s individual preferences based on her value of time;
operators must only grant a discount in case of a successful pooling of customers. Specifically,
our contributions are as follows. First, we prove that participating in a CCP mechanism is
a weakly dominant strategy for customers. Contrary, PCP mechanisms may lead to unprof-
itable matchings for customers or missed matchings that could have been profitable for both
customers and MSPs. We then implement the proposed pooling mechanisms in a simulation en-
vironment to conduct an extensive numerical study based on a real-world data set. We analyze
each mechanism’s impact on the customer’s cost, the operator’s profit, fleet utilization, and its
environmental impact. We synthesize several managerial insights by combining findings from
our formal analysis and our numerical results. Finally, we provide evidence that CCP mecha-
nisms are preferable over PCP mechanisms for both operators and customers while leading to
significant reductions in carbon dioxide emissions.
1.4. Structure
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces our problem setting, while
Section 3 presents our methodology, including a formal analysis of each matching mechanism.
We detail our numerical study and the design of experiments in Section 4 and discuss the impact
of the studied pooling mechanisms in Section 5. We synthesize these results in Section 6 to allow
for a high-level assessment. Section 7 concludes this paper with a short summary.
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2. Problem Setting
We consider mobility market places where MSPs interact with customers via an online platform,
e.g., a smartphone app, and offer ride-hailing services to customers. Using this platform, the
MSPs extract necessary customer information and set prices for solitary and pooled rides.
Customers request the MSPs’ services and choose a solitary ride or volunteer to be pooled.
In case a customer volunteers for pooling, she indicates her value of time, e.g., by selecting a
respective category in the app when submitting her request. If a customer volunteers to be
pooled (i.e., she is poolable), an MSP can match her request with another customer’s request
to a pooled ride, served by a single vehicle to reduce costs and to increase the fleet’s efficiency.
In return, the MSP compensates poolable customers with reduced prices compared to solitary
rides. In this context, we focus on the effect of matching mechanisms that MSPs may use to
form pooled rides. Accordingly, we abstract from the multiple MSP setting in the following
discussion and refer to a single MSP, i.e., its matching mechanism. Clearly, this does not
limit our results to a single MSP setting as all MSPs in such a system may use the analyzed
mechanisms.
2.1. Assumptions
First, we assume that all participants behave economically rational, aiming to minimize their
costs; the MSP always assigns cost-optimal routes, and customers prefer their cost-minimal
option. This is in line with recent studies in the field of mobility as a service. Accordingly, we
impose a customer’s maximum waiting time as a hard constraint. However, customer cost func-
tions are not subject to any conditions except that the value of time is non-negative. Therefore,
our framework allows to include maximum waiting times as a soft constraint, incorporated in
a customer’s cost function. Second, we assume that all customer requests arrive online and
require immediate pick-up. Third, we allow only two customers to share a ride at once. Both
assumptions reflect current best practices that keep passenger discomfort limited. Fourth, we
neglect fixed costs of the MSP as they do not affect short-term operational decisions.
2.2. Model
The realization of rides takes place on a road network, represented as a graph G = (L,A) with a
set of nodes L and a set of arcs A. Each node l ∈ L represents an origin or destination location
of a customer trip; each arc (l, l′) ∈ A denotes a shortest path between nodes l, l′ ∈ L.
For each customer i ∈ C, we define a customer trip request as a tuple ri = (oi, di, toi , vi, ωi, ρi),
consisting of the customer’s origin oi ∈ L, her destination di ∈ L, her preferred pick-up time
toi , her individual value of time vi ∈ R≥0, a maximum waiting time ωi, and a binary parameter
ρi ∈ {0, 1} indicating whether a customer participates in pooling (ρi = 1) or not (ρi = 0). If a
customer’s maximum waiting time ωi is exceeded, she cancels the travel request, i.e., a customer
only accepts a ride offer with a waiting time below ωi if all other constraints are met. As we
assume immediate pickup requests, the preferred pickup time of a customer equals the time the
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request is made.
Customer i’s costs comprise a payment p(i) to the MSP in exchange for the offered service
and the cost for the customer’s time spent. This cost depends on the time span between a
customer’s preferred pick up time at her origin (toi ) and the time when she is dropped at her
destination (tdi ), as well as on her individual value of time vi. Hence, both waiting and traveling
times induce costs for a customer i based on vi, defining her valuation for a time unit spent;
i.e., these costs of time account for the time between requesting a ride and arriving at her
destination. Then, a customer’s cost function reads





The MSP operates a fleet of vehicles u ∈ U that serve customers’ transportation requests.
Here, the MSP receives a fare for each served ride and aims to maximize its profit while account-
ing for milage dependent cost. The MSP matches customers to vehicles over a time horizon T .
Whenever a new customer request ri appears at time t ∈ T , the MSP assigns the customer to
either an empty vehicle or to a (potentially) ongoing ride in case that both customers volunteer
for pooling.
To describe the operational state of the MSP’s fleet over T , we use a schedule σ (u) for each
vehicle, which is an ordered list of quadruples. Each quadruple (lk, tk, ok, ck) links a vehicle’s
operation ok to a customer ck, location lk, and time tk. We order a schedule such that the time
component of each succeeding quadruple is increasing. A vehicle can perform three operations
(ok ∈ {PU,DO,REC}): when a vehicle picks a customer up (ok = PU), lk ∈ L denotes
a customer’s pickup location and tk denotes the currently scheduled (expected) pickup time.
When a vehicle drops a customer off (ok = DO), lk ∈ L denotes a customer’s drop-off location
and tk denotes the currently scheduled (expected) drop-off time. A vehicle receives a new
request when the MSP assigns a request to the vehicle (ok = REC). Here, lk and tk state
the time and vehicle location at the point of assignment such that lk can be either a location
(lk ∈ L) or a road segment (lk ∈ A).
Assigning a request to a vehicle requires scheduling all three operations at once: the vehicle’s
schedule needs to be recalculated such that it contains all operations for a customer in the
order REC → PU → DO. We use ←−σ t (u) to refer to the inactive part of vehicle u’s schedule
at time t ∈ T , i.e., the operations scheduled at tk < t that vehicle u processed up to time t .
Analogously, −→σ t (u) denotes the active part of schedule σ (u), i.e., scheduled operations with
tk ≥ t that have been assigned to vehicle u but not been processed up to time t.
Whenever we assign a customer to a vehicle at time t, we update its schedule σ (u) and
include the respective operations in −→σ t (u). This update may require updating already existing
entries in −→σ t (u), e.g., if picking up a new customer is included in between the pick-up and the
drop-off of an already active customer. Example 1 details the connection between the different
activities and the mechanism of assigning a request to a vehicle.
Example 1 We consider a customer i, her request ri, and two vehicles u1, u2. Let u1 be a
currently empty vehicle with no active schedule that is at location l1. If customer i is assigned
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to u1, its active schedule −→σ t
o
i (u1) is changed to
[
(l1, toi , REC, i), (oi, t̃1,1, PU, i), (di, t̃1,2, DO, i)
]
where t̃1,1 and t̃1,2 result from the shortest paths from l1 to oi and oi to di, respectively.
Let u2 be a vehicle which is currently at location l2 and has an active schedule of −→σ t
o
i (u2) =
[(oj , t2,1, PU, j), (dj , t2,2, DO, j)] where j is another customer that has requested a ride prior
to i. Customer i might be assigned to u2 by altering the future schedule of u2 in the follow-
ing way:
[
(l2, toi , REC, i), (oj , t̃2,1, PU, j), (oi, t̃2,2, PU, i), (di, t̃2,3, DO, i), (dj , t̃2,4, DO, j)
]
, where
t̃2,1, . . . , t̃2,4 are again determined by calculating the shortest paths between the respective loca-
tions of the activities. In this case, customer j is picked up before customer i and dropped off
after i is dropped off. Hence, i and j share a vehicle between oi and di.
3. Methodology
In the following, we first present different assignment mechanisms before we formally discuss
their properties and detail the flexibility of our CCP mechanism.
3.1. Mechanisms
We consider three different mechanisms, a PCP and a CCP mechanism, and a solitary rides
only option that serves as a baseline. These mechanisms are described in the following.
Solitary Rides Only: An MSP may offer only solitary rides, matching customers solely to
empty vehicles. Then, the MSP charges a payment pS(i) = pf+pv(oi, di) from customer i. Here,
pf constitutes a basic charge, independent of a customer’s origin and destination, while pv(oi, di)
constitutes a variable price component as a function of the customers origin-destination pair,
which is based on the length of the shortest path between oi and di and the time required to
traverse the path.
Definition 1 (Solitary Rides Only) In a solitary rides only (SRO) mechanism, the MSP
assigns vehicles in such a way that the total driving distance (including the distance between
a vehicles location and the origin of the customer) is minimized, and a vehicle picks up each
customer i within her maximal waiting interval ωi if possible. Customers are never pooled.
Provider-Centered Pooling: Offering discounts to customers in exchange for the customers’
willingness to be poolable is the status quo in most ride-hailing fleets (cf. Wang (2019)). Here,
an MSP pools customers among each other to increase its profit. However, a customer may
not be pooled if this benefits the MSP’s profit maximization. The MSP charges a payment
pPC(i) = δ ·pS(i) = δ ·
(
pf + pv(oi, di)
)
from customer i, with δ ∈ (0, 1] being the discount factor
offered to the customer for her willingness to be pooled. Often, the MSP imposes constraints on
possible matchings to limit customer inconvenience. We consider such constraints by limiting
the additional duration of customer trips to a detour factor ∆ ∈ R>0 that relates to the expected
duration of solitary rides.
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Definition 2 (Provider-Centered Pooling) In a PCP mechanism, each poolable customer i
pays δ · pS(i). In exchange, the MSP may pool i with other customers as long as i’s trip is not
prolonged by more than a factor 1 + ∆ compared to i’s solitary ride.
One of the main shortcomings of PCP is that the customer receives a discount independent
of the outcome of the MSP’s matching. Accordingly, one may see a customer’s willingness to be
pooled as a bet on receiving a free discount if no complementary ride exists. The MSP’s discount
offer remains a bet on receiving a sufficient complementary population of poolable customers,
assuming that it can compensate all offered discounts by increased operational efficiency, which
finally leads to an increase in profit. The MSP may match any poolable customers dynamically
while considering the ∆ constraints, such that its costs are minimized and hence its profit is
maximized. Therefore, in a PCP mechanism, only upper bounds on estimated times of arrival
and customers’ costs are known ex ante.
Customer-Centered Pooling: As outlined above, only allowing for solitary rides or em-
ploying PCP may yield disadvantages and undesirable effects. To this end, we propose an
alternative mechanism based on each customer’s cost function. Here, the MSP does no longer
offer an unconditioned discount to poolable customers. Instead, the MSP sets individual fares
for pooled rides, which split between matched customers such that each customer receives a
discount, e.g., proportional to her contribution to the necessary detours.
Let i be a poolable customer currently assigned to vehicle u and let j be a poolable customer




j be the (expected) pick-up time of customers
i and j. To calculate the fare of a pooled ride in this setting, we distinguish between scenarios
in which i has or has not yet been picked up at the time that u receives the request of j, i.e., if
tpi ≤ toj or toj < t
p
i . Let l be the location at which u receives the request of j, i.e., the location
of u when its active schedule is changed to pool customers i and j. Let tdi , tdj be the respective
expected drop-off times of customers i and j. Then, the fare for a pooled ride results to
pCC(i, j) =

pf + pv(oi, l) + pv(l, oj) + pv(oj , di) + pv(di, dj) + pc if tpi ≤ toj ≤ t
p
j ≤ tdi ≤ tdj
pf + pv(oi, l) + pv(l, oj) + pv(oj , dj) + pv(dj , di) + pc if tpi ≤ toj ≤ t
p
j ≤ tdj ≤ tdi




j ≤ tdi ≤ tdj




j ≤ tdj ≤ tdi




i ≤ tdi ≤ tdj




i ≤ tdj ≤ tdi ,
(2)
where pc is a fixed change fee for altering the vehicle schedule after the initial assignment of i.
We now recall that customer i would pay pS(i) = pf + pv(oi, di) if she decided to take a
solitary ride. In this case, her total cost result to cS(i) = pS(i) + vi · (td,Si − toi ), with t
d,S
i being
her drop-off time in the solitary case. Then, from the perspective of the total cost incurred, a
CCP is beneficial for the coalition of customers i and j if and only if
cS(i) + cS(j) > pCC(i, j) + vi(td,CCi − t
o






with td,CCi and t
d,CC
j being the drop-off times for customers i and j for the pooled ride. If
Equation 3 holds true, there exists a division of pCC(i, j) among both customers such that
pCC(i, j) = pCC(i) + pCC(j) and their individual costs for the pooled ride are lower than for
taking a solitary ride. In this case, the MSP implements the schedule for which such a division
exists and determines payments such that both participants profit from being pooled.
Definition 3 (Customer-Centered Pooling) In a CCP mechanism, the MSP may pool cus-
tomers as long as it defines payments in such a way that each pooled customer i incurs lower
cost compared to taking a solitary ride, i.e., pCC(i) + vi(td,CCi − toi ) ≤ cS(i) ∀i ∈ C.
The CCP mechanism allows for various pricing schemes to split payments between customers.
Indeed, any pricing scheme can be implemented as long as each customer’s resulting total costs
are at most equal to taking a solitary ride. In this case, the pooling decision is independent of
the eventual division of payments (i.e., we obtain the same pooling, regardless of the payments).
Observation 1 In the CCP mechanism, cost sharing is independent from pooling decisions.
We note that a customer can be pooled with two or more customers during the same trip if
this is profitable. However, we do not allow more than two customers to be on the same vehicle
at once. In addition, the probability of pooled rides decreases during the ride for customers,
i.e., the closer customers get to their destination. For example, if a customer is one block away
from her destination, a detour is unlikely to occur, since the possible savings for the shared
portion of the remaining trip are unlikely to exceed the costs of the additional time required
to pick up another customer. That is, if customer i is in the taxi already, td,CCi and therewith
vi(td,CCi − toi ) would increase to pick up an additional customer j, while cS(i) + cS(j)− pCC(i, j)
decreases the closer i is to her destination.
3.2. Properties
We now discuss properties of the pooling mechanisms and refer to Appendix A for all proofs.
As a direct consequence of the definition of CCP, we find that if an MSP offers CCP pooling, it
is individually rational for a customer to volunteer for pooling. Setting oneself poolable cannot
lead to a cost increase in case of a successful pooling.
Theorem 1 In a CCP mechanism, it is individually rational for a customer to participate in
pooling.
Indeed, for each poolable customer, neither actions of other customers (i.e., whether they set
themselves poolable or not) nor the actions of the MSP (i.e., which poolings and pricing mech-
anism it chooses) can lead to an outcome which is worse than being non-poolable. This allows
for the following strengthened result.
Corollary 1 In a CCP mechanism, it is a weakly dominant strategy for each customer to set
herself poolable, regardless of other customers’ or the MSP’s actions.
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Moreover, we observe that a CCP mechanism mitigates the MSP’s risk to reduce fares without
realizing a beneficial, cost-compensating matching.
Observation 2 In a CCP mechanism, the MSP does no longer bear the risk for sunk costs
that result from fare discounts granted for unsuccessful matchings.
For customers who participate in PCP, volunteering for pooling is not always beneficial,
because a customer’s cost may be higher due to her detour, i.e., pS(i) + vi(td,Si − toi ) < pPC(i) +
vi(td,PCi − toi ) = δ · pS(i) + vi(t
d,PC




i being the drop-off times for SRO
and PCP respectively.
Theorem 2 Given a PCP mechanism, setting oneself poolable is not a weakly dominant strat-
egy for any customer.
Indeed, Theorem 3 shows that regardless of the pricing structure of the PCP mechanism, its
inflexibility may lead to welfare losses either for customers or for all participants.
Theorem 3 Fixed discounts and arrival time guarantees in PCP mechanisms can either lead
to unprofitable poolings for customers or missed pooling opportunities that would have been
profitable for both customers and the MSP.
Our formal analysis suggests that from a customer’s perspective, CCP is superior to PCP
as it avoids unfair discount sharing. Indeed, various reports give evidence that in current
PCP systems, customers gamble by setting themselves poolable, hoping to receive a discounted
solitary ride and complain about inconvenience in case they lose the gamble and get pooled
(c.f. Morris et al., 2020). Accordingly, one may expect more customers to participate in a CCP
system compared to a PCP system in the long run.
A CCP mechanism also offers advantages to the MSP as discounts only apply to customers
who actively contribute to the pooling. However, it remains an open question whether CCP or
PCP allows for overall more efficient and profitable operations. In the remainder of this paper,
we investigate this question through a profound numerical study.
3.3. Pricing Flexibility of the Customer-Centered Pooling
Mechanism
We recall that one advantage of the CCP mechanism is its flexibility in cost-sharing. As two
customers are only pooled if the shared ride’s total cost is lower than the sum of the solitary
ride costs, there always exists a fare split such that both customers profit. Many cost-sharing
mechanisms have been studied in the literature, e.g., dividing the profit equitable by using
the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953; Wang et al., 2017). An alternative approach to increase
customers’ willingness to participate in pooling is to maximize their chances for substantial
savings. In the following, we present an integer program that allows for ex-post optimization
to identify the maximum share of customers that profit from savings of at minimum Φ. An
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MSP may use such an ex-post optimum to implement a corresponding pricing scheme to meet
customer preferences.
We define a run R of a vehicle as a part of its schedule that starts from the time when it
picks up a single customer until being empty again. Let R be the set of runs. For each R ∈ R,
CR indicates the customers that are served during run R and pR denotes the total fare charged
by the MSP. For each customer i ∈ C, cSi denotes i’s total cost if she would take a solitary
ride and ai denotes the cost of time that i incurs as a result of being pooled. Let pi ∈ R be
the fare that i has to pay, while φi defines the relative cost savings for customer i with price
pi, i.e., (pi + ai) = (1 − φi)cSi . Further, Φ ≥ 0 denotes the relative cost savings that should
be reached for a maximum number of customers. For each customer i ∈ C we define a binary










pi = pR ∀R ∈ R (4b)
(pi + ai) = (1− φi)cSi ∀i ∈ C (4c)
Φσi ≤ φi ∀i ∈ C (4d)
pi ∈ R, φi ∈ R≥0, σi ∈ {0, 1} ∀i ∈ C (4e)
The IP maximizes the number of customers that achieve relative cost savings of at least Φ.
Constraints (4b) distribute the sum of fares among all customers of a pooling run. Con-
straints (4c)&(4d) define the relative savings of all customers. The domain of the savings
(4e) assures that no customer is worse off than if she would have taken a solitary ride.
Straightforwardly maximizing the number of customers with high savings causes reduced
savings for customers that fall below Φ, because the optimization will keep some customers’
savings low or even at 0% if this leads to more customers with substantial savings. To counteract
this effect, we use goal programming and increase the threshold for Φ iteratively. For example,
we can start with setting Φ0 = 0.05, maximizing the number of customers that save at least
5% by participating in pooling. Let Σ0 be the result of the optimization. In the next step, we
introduce another binary variable σ0i for each customer i and add constraints
Φ0σ0i ≤ φi ∀i ∈ C∑
i
σ0i ≥ Σ0 ∀i ∈ C,
define a new threshold Φ0 = 0.10, and maximize the number of customers that save at least
10% while not lowering the number of customers that save at least 5% from the first iteration.
This way, we iteratively maximize the number of customers who obtain large savings without
reducing other customers’ savings.
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4. Design of Experiments
We conduct a large-scale simulation to numerically evaluate the proposed matching mechanisms’
effects, using an SRO solution as a baseline. In this simulation, we use a greedy assignment
mechanism to form matches. Each customer request that enters the system triggers an im-
mediate matching decision of the MSP. We implemented the simulation environment in Java
and used Open Street Map1 for road network data, and OSM2PO library2 for vehicle routing
decisions.
Our experiments base on the New York Taxi and Limousine Commission data,3 which includes
the origin-destination pairs of taxi trips in New York City. We focus on a representative sample
of 9,388 trips, originating and ending in Manhattan, south of Central Park on August 27 , 2015,
starting between 9 am and 10 am. We calculate basic (SRO) fares with an initial charge (pf) of
$2.50 plus $0.50 per 1/5 mile4 (pv(oi, di)). We assume non-autonomous vehicles with low-wage
drivers, resulting in provider cost of $2.945 per mile (Bösch et al., 2018; Lanzetti et al., 2020).
We create a customer request for each trip and consider five different value of time categories,
discretizing the value of time interval [0.166$/min, 0.283$/min] as stated in Wadud (2017) into
{0.166$/min, 0.195$/min, 0.225$/min, 0.254$/min, 0.283$/min} and uniformly draw a value of
time vi out of this set for each customer i ∈ C. We account for a maximum customer waiting
time of two, four, or six minutes and consider an MSP with a fleet of 1,000–3,000 vehicles.
We compare PCP and CCP matching mechanisms for this setting with different change fees,
discount, and detour factors.
We aim to exploit the impact of different matching strategies for today’s ride-hailing systems
with our experiments. Herein, we base our studies on analyzing the different improvement levers
outlined in Section 1.1. Apparently, there is neither consensus nor evidence on how customers
react to the different matching strategies and how the share of customers willing to participate in
ride-pooling will be affected. Hence, we extend our studies to scenarios with different matching
acceptance rates (MARs), i.e., different customer share levels willing to participate in pooling.
Table 1 summarizes the parameters and treatment variables of our experiments.
Table 1.: Experiment parameters and treatment variables.
Parameters SRO initial charge (pf) $2.50
distance-dependent charge (pv(o, d)) $0.50 per 1/5 mile
value of time (φc) [$/min] U{0.166, 0.195, 0.225, 0.254, 0.283}
Treatment variables matching mechanism {SRO, PCP, CCP}
max. customer waiting time [seconds] {120, 240, 360}
MAR [%] {10, 20, . . . , 100}
number of vehicles {1000, 1500, 2000, 2500, 3000}
change fee (pc, CCP only) {1.50, 2.00, 2.50, 3.00}
discount factor (δ, PCP only) {0.70, 0.75, 0.80, 0.85, 0.90, 1.00}







In the following, we analyze the operational impact of the studied pooling mechanisms based on
our simulation. We first analyze these impacts from a system perspective (Section 5.1), before
we focus on an operator perspective (Section 5.2) and a customer perspective (Section 5.3).
5.1. System Perspective
We first analyze a system’s service rate, i.e., the share of customers whose requests can be served
by the ride-hailing system without violating any constraints, e.g., on waiting times or detours.
To this end, Table 2 shows the average share of unserved customers for a SRO mechanism and
for both pooling mechanism over all combinations of waiting times, number of vehicles, and
mechanism settings. Even the SRO mechanism yields a service rate of 99.35% as the fleet size
is sufficiently large.
However, both pooling mechanisms allow to further decrease the number of unserved customer
requests, especially for increasing MARs. Here, the CCP mechanism outperforms the PCP
mechanism such that a service level of 99.97% can be reached with the CCP mechanism for an
MAR of 100%.
Result 1 Pooling increases a ride-hailing fleet’s service rate. In this context, the CCP mecha-
nism outperforms the PCP mechanism for every MAR level.
Tables 3 and 4 detail the sensitivity of this observation with respect to the fleet size (Table 3)
and with respect to a customer’s maximum waiting time (Table 4). Table 3 shows that the
impact of both pooling mechanisms on improving the customer service level increases for smaller
fleet sizes. Indeed, compensating the service rate improvement of each pooling mechanism in
SRO operations would require a fleet size increase of 1000 vehicles. Again, the CCP mechanism
outperforms the PCP mechanism in all scenarios. Table 4 complements this analysis with
sensitivities on the maximum customer waiting time. Both pooling mechanisms outperform the
Table 2.: Average percentage share of unserved customers for each mechanisms and varying MARs.
MAR [%]
Mechanism 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
SRO 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65
CCP 0.56 0.45 0.37 0.30 0.21 0.18 0.13 0.09 0.06 0.03
PCP 0.60 0.53 0.43 0.36 0.28 0.26 0.19 0.15 0.12 0.09
Table 3.: Average percentage share of unserved
customers for each mechanism and varying
fleet size.
number of vehicles
Mechanism 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000
SRO 1.91 0.74 0.33 0.16 0.11
CCP 0.77 0.24 0.09 0.05 0.03
PCP 0.97 0.31 0.12 0.06 0.04
Table 4.: Average percentage share of unserved
customers for varying maximal customer
waiting times.
max. waiting time
Mechanism 120 240 360
SRO 0.99 0.12 0.0021
CCP 0.69 0.02 0.0009
PCP 0.86 0.04 0.0010
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SRO mechanism, and the CCP mechanism outperforms the PCP mechanism, in particular if
the maximum customer waiting time is small.
Result 2 The impact of pooling on the fleet’s service level compared to SRO is higher for
smaller fleet sizes and low customer waiting times. In any case, both pooling mechanisms
perform better than solitary operations, and the CCP mechanism performs better than the PCP
mechanism.
From this initial analysis, we conclude that a fleet of 2,000 vehicles is sufficient to serve
around 99.9% of trips in our studies. As we are interested in the difference between PCP and
CCP pooling mechanisms rather than in the general savings potential of pooling in undersized
fleets, we thus fix the fleet size to 2,000 vehicles for all subsequent analysis.
Next, we analyze the share of pooled customers for each pooling mechanism. Figure 1 shows
the percentage of pooled customers over varying MARs for different PCP and CCP settings,
based on the population of poolable customers.5 Both pooling mechanisms are susceptible to the
respective MAR. While we observe large increases in the number of pooled customers for MAR
increases up to 40%, we observe diminishing improvements for higher MARs. Additionally,
the CCP mechanism is sensitive to its change fee such that a 50% increase in pc may cause a
decrease in the share of pooled customers of up to 20 percentage points for high MARs. The
PCP mechanism remains sensitive to the maximum detour threshold such that one may increase
the share of pooled customers up to 20 percentage points by a 40 percentage point increase in ∆.
Moreover, the PCP mechanism yields less stable results for lower ∆, while the CCP mechanisms
show in general smaller deviations in between different simulation runs.
Result 3 The number of pooled customers grows with the population of poolable customers.


































Figure 1.: Percentage of pooled customers for different mechanisms and MARs, as a share of the
population of poolable customers.
5Trivially, the share of pooled customers as part of the overall population increases with increasing
MARs.
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We focus on reducing a fleet’s overall traveled distance to analyze potential emission or energy
savings, which allows us to quantify respective savings without specifying a fleet’s drivetrain
technology. Figure 2 shows the fleet’s average traveled distance savings for the CCP and the
PCP mechanism and different values of pc and ∆. To this end, we note that the discount factor
δ does not affect pooling decisions in the PCP mechanism as customers receive the discount
independent of the pooling decision. Accordingly, we exclude δ from the following analysis. For
MARs above 40%, both mechanisms allow for substantial distance savings of more than 9%
and up to 32%. For the studied parameter ranges, the CCP mechanism always yields higher
distance savings, particularly for high MARs where we observe differences of up to 7 percentage
points.
Result 4 Independent of the pooling mechanism, pooling allows for distance savings of up to
32%. Herein, the CCP mechanism yields better results than the PCP mechanism, in particular
for high MARs.
In our scenario, a 5% reduction in distance equals a reduction of 0.16 metric tons of car-
bon dioxide emissions.6 Noting that these emission savings relate to a single 30 minute time
interval, our results emphasize the significant potential that passenger pooling bears from an













































Mechanism pc ∆ 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
CCP 2.00 2.08 4.90 8.24 11.92 15.16 18.47 21.8 25.15 28.81 32.48
CCP 2.50 2.03 4.83 8.25 11.91 15.12 18.55 21.86 25.16 28.78 32.46
CCP 3.00 1.86 4.71 7.86 11.50 14.70 18.05 21.26 24.53 28.05 31.63
PCP 0.1 1.29 3.52 6.04 9.08 11.72 14.17 17.07 19.78 22.7 25.66
PCP 0.3 1.84 4.51 7.56 11.12 14.26 17.38 20.48 23.55 27.08 30.62
PCP 0.5 1.94 4.77 8.02 11.44 14.61 17.88 20.92 24.31 27.73 31.35





We now analyze the difference between both pooling mechanisms from a ride-hailing provider’s
perspective, i.e., we analyze the impact of both mechanisms on a fleet’s profit. Naturally, an
operator will only use a pooling mechanism if it yields increased profits compared to operating
solitary rides. Therefore, we first analyze for which parameters each mechanism is viable.
Figure 3 shows the profit for both pooling mechanisms over varying MARs, compared to the
profits for solitary operation. We detail the PCP profits for varying discount factors δ ∈
{0.7, 0.75, 0.8, 0.85, 0.9} in Figure 3a, while Figure 3b shows the CCP profits for varying change
fees pc ∈ {1.5, 2.0, 2.5, 3.0}. For the sake of conciseness, Figure 3a only shows results for a
detour factor of ∆ = 0.3 as we observe similar trends for other detour factors.
Notably, both mechanisms only show increasing profit curves for a change fee of at minimum
pc ≥ 2.00 (CCP) or a discount factor of at most δ = 0.8 (PCP). Within these settings, the
provider may strive for a larger MAR in order to maximize its profits. Remarkably, we observe
an adverse behavior for both pooling mechanisms with δ = 0.7 or pc = 1.5. In these cases,
pooled operations yield less profits than SRO operations, with increasing losses for increasing
MARs. Here, each additional poolable customer leads to a profit decrease, because either her
guaranteed discount outweighs the cost reduction from pooling her (PCP), or the low change fee
leads to poolings being beneficial for customers, but not for the provider (CCP). The latter effect
shows that the profitability of a CCP matching algorithm still depends on the right parameter
setting, although it avoids sunk costs in unsuccessful pooling by design (cf. Section 3.2).
Result 5 Provider profits increase with increasing matching acceptance rates, except for CCP
mechanisms with low change fees pc or PCP mechanisms with low δ.
Based on these initial results, we limit subsequent analyses to δ ≥ 0.8 and pc ≥ 2.00.
Table 5 further details for various settings of pc, ∆, and δ, and varying MARs, the average
additional profit for PCP and CCP mechanisms as a percentage of the profit that can be
achieved in an SRO setting. Both pooling mechanisms may yield substantial profit increases,
in particular for MARs of 50% or higher. However, the viability of both pooling mechanisms
may vary significantly dependent on the respective parameter settings. The PCP mechanism
may yield decreasing profits for δ = 0.8 if ∆ and the MAR is small. While the PCP mechanism
yields higher profit gains for favorable parameter settings, it also tends to show a higher variation






































δ ● 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90
(a) PCP profit for varying δ with ∆ = 0.3.






































pc ● 1.50 2.00 2.50 3.00
(b) CCP profit for varying pc.
Figure 3.: Additional profit of PCP and CCP compared to SRO for varying δ and pc.
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Table 5.: Average additional profit for varying MARs compared to profits under SRO (in percent).
MAR
Mechanism pc δ ∆ 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
CCP 2.00 2.59 5.42 8.46 11.74 14.15 16.24 18.40 20.55 22.46 24.24
CCP 2.50 3.86 8.72 14.74 20.68 25.73 31.03 36.32 41.29 46.59 51.59
CCP 3.00 4.53 11.11 18.22 26.07 33.14 40.44 47.29 54.53 61.76 68.96
PCP 0.8 0.1 -4.12 -4.59 -4.64 -2.62 -1.60 -1.28 0.97 2.28 4.01 5.78
PCP 0.8 0.3 -1.77 -0.29 1.97 5.97 9.44 12.73 15.86 18.82 23.07 27.41
PCP 0.8 0.5 -1.25 0.89 4.03 7.43 11.07 14.99 17.81 22.10 25.85 30.60
PCP 0.85 0.1 -1.65 0.48 3.26 8.17 11.80 14.73 19.60 23.54 28.04 32.57
PCP 0.85 0.3 0.69 4.79 9.87 16.76 22.84 28.75 34.49 40.07 47.11 54.22
PCP 0.85 0.5 1.22 5.97 11.93 18.22 24.48 31.00 36.44 43.36 49.89 57.41
PCP 0.9 0.1 0.82 5.55 11.17 18.95 25.21 30.75 38.23 44.79 52.08 59.37
PCP 0.9 0.3 3.16 9.86 17.77 27.54 36.24 44.76 53.12 61.33 71.14 81.03
PCP 0.9 0.5 3.69 11.05 19.84 29.00 37.89 47.02 55.07 64.61 73.92 84.21
between different settings; in particular, it has more settings on which the profit decreases. On
the contrary, the CCP mechanism shows a lower maximum profit increase but more stable
results with respect to potential losses. Here, it is worth noting that the PCP mechanism
outperforms the CCP mechanism only for settings in which customers accept a small discount
and a large detour. Accordingly, it remains questionable how many customers may participate
in such a pooling system in practice.
Result 6 Both pooling mechanisms allow for large profit increases but remain sensitive to their
respective parameter settings. While the PCP mechanism may allow for the largest profit in-
crease, the CCP mechanism remains more robust with respect to potential losses.
A higher detour factor increases an operator’s operational options, such that one would expect
a proportional improvement in the MSP’s returns. This effect holds true when increasing ∆
from 10% to 30%, regardless of the MAR, but falls short for an increase from 30% to 50%. For
example, for δ = 0.85, the provider’s profit does not differ significantly between ∆ = 0.3 and
∆ = 0.5 and a corresponding Wilcoxon signed-rank test yields p = 0.7766 such that we observe
diminishing returns. This effect results from the high availability of vehicles: In many cases,
using a nearby empty vehicle to serve a customer alone is more efficient than making a large
detour.
Result 7 Increasing the detour factor ∆ in a PCP mechanism may yield diminishing returns
for the provider if the fleet size is sufficiently large.
5.3. Customer Perspective
In the following, we compare the different pooling mechanisms concerning their impact on
customer costs. Although higher discounts, in general, imply lower total costs for customers,
we keep the limited parameter selection from Section 5.2 to account for an operator’s rational
constraints. To analyze cost effects, one may use three different customer populations: all
customers in the system, poolable customers, and finally pooled customers. In the following,
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we compare poolable customers’ costs because it allows analyzing the benefits for customers to
set themselves poolable directly.
Figure 4 shows the decrease in cost per poolable customer as percentage share of the solitary
ride costs over all MARs. To improve readability we group the pooling mechanisms with regard
to their similarity in costs and profits. Table 6 complements our cost analysis by showing the
average cost per poolable customer over varying MARs for different PCP and CCP settings.
Analogously to positive system effects and provider profits, average cost reductions increase
with higher MARs. When using a CCP mechanism, customers gain on average a minimum cost
savings of about 9% independent of the respective MAR and for any pc. With higher MARs,
this savings may increase up to 18%. Potential cost savings for the PCP mechanism tend to













































































































































● PCP,δ=0.9, ∆=0.1 PCP,δ=0.9, ∆=0.3 PCP,δ=0.9, ∆=0.5 CCP, pc=3.00
Figure 4.: Average cost reduction per poolable customer for different mechanisms and MARs as per-
centage of SRO cost.
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Table 6.: Average cost reduction per poolable customer for different mechanisms and MARs as compared
to SRO (in percent).
MAR
Mechanism pc δ ∆ 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
CCP 2.00 12.35 13.94 14.92 15.75 16.25 16.66 16.93 17.17 17.55 17.83
PCP 0.80 0.1 17.44 17.64 17.82 18.03 18.21 18.40 18.58 18.84 19.00 19.24
PCP 0.80 0.3 16.62 16.75 16.74 16.96 17.11 17.25 17.48 17.80 18.01 18.19
PCP 0.80 0.5 15.88 15.68 15.76 15.81 16.00 16.22 16.41 16.69 16.89 17.10
CCP 2.50 10.41 11.71 12.58 13.28 13.64 13.99 14.17 14.33 14.53 14.72
PCP 0.85 0.1 13.18 13.37 13.56 13.77 13.94 14.13 14.31 14.57 14.73 14.97
PCP 0.85 0.3 12.36 12.49 12.48 12.70 12.85 12.99 13.22 13.53 13.74 13.93
PCP 0.85 0.5 11.62 11.42 11.50 11.54 11.74 11.95 12.14 12.42 12.62 12.83
CCP 3.00 8.79 10.06 10.61 11.32 11.59 11.87 12.05 12.12 12.31 12.48
PCP 0.90 0.1 8.92 9.11 9.29 9.50 9.68 9.87 10.04 10.30 10.47 10.70
PCP 0.90 0.3 8.09 8.22 8.22 8.43 8.58 8.72 8.95 9.26 9.47 9.66
PCP 0.90 0.5 7.36 7.15 7.23 7.28 7.47 7.69 7.87 8.15 8.35 8.56
Remarkably, even for a PCP mechanism without any discount (δ = 1.00), poolable customers
may experience a slight cost reduction for ∆ = 0.1. When considering the total population of
customers, a PCP mechanism with δ = 1.00 leads to cost savings even for larger ∆. This effect
results because pooling allows for a more efficient usage of vehicles and hence for earlier customer
arrivals, which reduces a customer’s total cost without any discount on customer payments.
Result 8 Pooling is cost-beneficial for customers independent of the pooling mechanism. For
the PCP mechanism, slight cost reductions exist even without a discount, especially for high
MARs.
One advantage of the CCP mechanism is its flexible pricing, which allows to design cost
sharing among customers such that as many customers as possible save a substantial cost share
compared to a solitary ride (cf. Section 3.3). In the following, we detail such cost shares focusing
on two different pricing schemes for the CCP mechanism, which we refer to as CCP(Shapley) and
CCP(IP), and various PCP settings. In CCP(Shapley), the savings for two pooled customers are
shared according to the Shapley value. For CCP(IP), we employ the IP with goal programming
as described in Section 3.3. We first maximize the number of customers that save at least 5%
of costs as compared to a solitary ride and then iteratively increase the threshold to maximize
the number of customers saving at least 10%, 15%, and 20% of costs.
Table 7 shows the customers’ share that saves a minimum percentage share of costs for
the described mechanisms for MARs of 20% and 50%. For the sake of conciseness, we only
report results for these two settings, which represent a thinner and a thicker market of poolable
customers. The tendency of the reported results holds true for other MAR values. We note
that no customer makes a loss by design when participating in a CCP mechanism. For the PCP
settings, corner cases exist in which some customers are worse off compared to not participating
in the pooling mechanism. For example, given a δ of 0.9, there exist customers that would have
received a ride with a lower total cost if they would not have set themselves poolable.
In the low-cost setting, the PCP mechanisms achieve higher customer shares with savings up
to 15%, while the CCP mechanism achieves a higher customer share with savings of at minimum
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Table 7.: Overview of customers’ savings when setting themself poolable for PCP mechanisms and CCP
mechanisms (in percentage of poolable customers, compared to not setting themselves poolable).
MAR = 20%, total cost improves MAR = 50%, total cost improves
Mechanism pc δ ∆ ≥ 0% ≥ 5% ≥ 10% ≥ 15% ≥ 20% ≥ 0% ≥ 5% ≥ 10% ≥ 15% ≥ 20%
CCP(Shapley) 2.00 100.00 78.13 52.00 30.05 13.55 100.00 80.64 56.72 33.22 15.94
CCP(IP) 2.00 100.00 91.44 70.40 41.82 18.15 100.00 94.52 77.45 36.11 31.39
PCP 0.80 0.1 100.00 99.96 99.89 89.65 14.21 100.00 99.99 99.88 92.41 13.87
PCP 0.80 0.3 100.00 100.00 98.48 69.31 10.16 100.00 99.97 98.68 70.31 9.34
PCP 0.80 0.5 100.00 99.62 93.79 54.14 7.93 100.00 99.75 94.56 52.84 6.81
CCP(Shapley) 2.50 100.00 69.65 41.59 20.52 7.28 100.00 72.09 43.26 21.00 8.53
CCP(IP) 2.50 100.00 84.03 57.66 28.61 10.97 100.00 88.37 61.85 23.08 18.29
PCP 0.85 0.1 99.96 99.89 96.92 17.94 4.51 100.00 99.92 97.58 18.04 4.26
PCP 0.85 0.3 100.00 99.47 79.29 12.84 3.20 99.98 99.47 80.06 11.80 3.00
PCP 0.85 0.5 99.88 96.33 61.77 10.12 2.33 99.91 96.72 60.88 8.74 2.17
CCP(Shapley) 3.00 100.00 62.41 32.43 13.92 5.48 100.00 63.42 33.15 14.31 5.46
CCP(IP) 3.00 100.00 77.99 46.94 21.35 8.56 100.00 80.06 48.20 16.48 12.62
PCP 0.90 0.1 99.89 99.46 23.45 6.02 1.25 99.94 99.54 23.38 5.58 1.25
PCP 0.90 0.3 99.89 87.00 16.62 4.31 1.13 99.84 88.02 14.80 3.89 1.03
PCP 0.90 0.5 97.98 69.35 12.99 3.34 0.80 98.14 69.44 11.23 2.79 0.69
20%. For medium-cost and high-cost settings, the CCP mechanisms start to outperform the
PCP mechanisms at cost savings of 15% and 10% respectively. This effect shows that the
PCP mechanism is strongly constrained by its fixed discount, whereas the CCP mechanism can
handle customer specific discounts more flexible, especially for higher cost-settings.
Comparing the CCP pricing schemes, we note that employing the goal programming ap-
proach increases the number of customers with high cost savings of more than 15%, without
worsening the share of customers that save at minimum 5% or 10% of costs. Accordingly, the
goal programming approach outperforms the Shapley-based pricing.
Result 9 The number of customers that receive substantial savings by setting themselves poolable
is larger for CCP than for PCP mechanisms. For PCP mechanisms with a discount factor of
δ = 0.9, some pooled customers may have a higher total cost than for a solitary ride.
6. Synthesis
In the following, we summarize the trade-offs and synergy potential, which we observed in
Section 5. For this discussion, we define three categories of matching mechanisms: low-cost
mechanisms are a CCP mechanism with pC = 2.0 and a PCP mechanism with δ = 0.8; we
refer to a CCP mechanism with pC = 2.5 and a PCP mechanism with δ = 0.85 as medium-cost
mechanisms; and to a CCP mechanism with pC = 3.0 and a PCP mechanism with δ = 0.9 as
high-cost mechanisms.
In general, we observe that whenever a pooling mechanism is profitable for the provider, it
also yields an improvement from a system perspective.
Result 10 If a specific pooling mechanism is profitable for the MSP, it always yields improve-
ments from a system and a customer perspective by reducing CO2 emissions, improving the
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service rate, and reducing travel cost. The benefits for all participants increase with increasing
MARs.
From a system perspective, a CCP mechanism dominates a PCP mechanism. Choosing lower
cost parameters δ and pc leads to higher distance and emission savings and may foster higher
MARs.
From a provider perspective, we assume the mechanism selection to be mostly profit-driven.
Accordingly, an MSP may generally favor a high-cost or medium-cost mechanism, even if this
entails a low MAR. This reveals a goal conflict between the system optimal mechanism and the
MSP’s choice. Indeed, a provider prefers high- and medium-cost mechanisms even if they result
in vastly lower MARs (cf. Table 5).
Our overall results suggest that the analyzed CCP mechanisms may often dominate related
PCP mechanisms. To formally analyze this conjecture, we use the concept of Pareto dominance.
Definition 4 (Pareto Dominance) A pooling mechanism M1 (Pareto) dominates another
mechanism M2 (M1  M2) if the average profit of the provider in M1 is at least as high as in
M2, and the average costs for customers in M1 are at most as high as in M2. If M1 dominates
M2 only for a specific MAR range (α−β), we say thatM1 partially dominatesM2 (M1
α−β
 M2).
Figure 5 shows the dominance relationships between the analyzed pooling mechanisms. Here,
an arrow and its MAR label visualize the (partial) dominance of a mechanism. These relations
allow for the following findings.
Only low-cost PCP mechanisms with δ = 0.8 and ∆ ≤ 0.3 remain non-dominated because
these PCP mechanisms yield the highest customer cost savings. However, these mechanisms
yield a maximum provider profit increase of 5.78% at a MAR of 100%, which remains below
the profit increase most medium and high-cost mechanisms achieve for a MAR of 20% (see
Section 5.2). A CCP counterpart partially dominates all other PCP mechanisms.
Observation 3 Low-cost PCP mechanisms need significantly higher MARs compared to all
other mechanisms in order to be profitable for the provider. Still, a CCP mechanism with
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Figure 5.: Domination Relationships between mechanisms.
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For medium-cost mechanisms we observe a similar trend.
Observation 4 For medium-cost mechanisms a CCP mechanism with a change fee of pC =
2.50 Pareto dominates PCP mechanisms with δ = 0.85,∆ ≥ 0.3 for MARs between 30% and
60%.
For both the low-cost and the medium-cost mechanisms, the corresponding CCP mechanism
leads to higher profits than the PCP mechanism for low MARs. For high cost-mechanisms,
analogous recommendations remain less obvious. A CCP mechanism clearly dominates a PCP
mechanism with ∆ = 0.1. For larger ∆, a CCP mechanism only dominates a PCP mechanism
up to a MAR of 20% and 30%, respectively. For larger MARs, PCP leads to higher profits.
To synthesize these observations, we note that Figure 5 indicates that for most MARs up
to 60%, both customers and provider would prefer a cheaper PCP mechanism with a ∆ of 0.5
over a more expensive PCP mechanism with a ∆ of 0.1. Accordingly, we focus the following
synthesis to PCP mechanisms with ∆ = 0.5.
Focusing solely on the analyzed dominance relations points towards the benefit of a CCP
mechanism in specific scenarios but does not allow for a general conclusion. While this discussion
seems to be fair by definition, we may question the underlying assumption that the CCP and
PCP mechanisms will always yield the same MAR share. Accordingly, we relax this assumption
in the following and conjecture that a CCP mechanism may yield higher MARs compared
to a PCP mechanism, as participating in CCP pooling remains a weekly-dominant strategy
for customers. Indeed, a high-cost PCP mechanism might lead to an increase in cost for some
customers. Moreover, the fraction of poolable customers that decrease their cost by 10% or more
is significantly larger in a CCP mechanism. Figure 6 shows the profit for each CCP mechanism
and MARs between 10% and 60% in relation to the profit of the respective PCP mechanism
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Figure 6.: Comparison of CCP and PCP mechanisms for different MARs.
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for MARs between 10% and 40%. As can be seen, the CCP mechanism yields significantly
higher profits in the low-cost scenario, even if the MAR of the CCP would be hypothetically
lower than for the PCP setting. For the medium-cost scenario, the CCP mechanism yields
higher profits at any MAR than the PCP mechanism, allowing for a significantly increased
delta for higher MARs. For the high-cost scenario, the PCP mechanism generates higher profit
assuming an equal MAR of 30% or 40% compared to the CCP mechanism. However, assuming
a slightly higher MAR for the CCP mechanism compared to the PCP mechanism remedies this
disadvantage.
In conclusion, a CCP mechanism appears to be the preferable mechanism from a provider
profit perspective if it leads to slightly higher MARs than a PCP mechanism. We argue that
the lower average cost for customers at high MARs and the better prospect of obtaining no-
ticeable savings without the chance of making a loss (cf. Section 3.3) leads to a higher MAR
when employing a CCP mechanism. Moreover, CCP mechanisms always lead to better sys-
tem performance. Accordingly, our results indicate that operating a ride-pooling system with
a CCP mechanism may improve the overall system performance in terms of a higher service
rate and less carbon dioxide emissions while creating a win-win situation for fleet operators and
customers.
7. Conclusion
We studied pooling mechanisms for on-demand pooling in today’s ride-hailing fleets. To this
end, we presented a customer-centered mechanism (CCP) that accounts or each customer’s in-
convenience and splits resulting cost savings accordingly. We compared this mechanism with
a standard provider-centered mechanism (PCP) in which the operator pools customers in ex-
change for a fixed discount. We formally analyzed both mechanisms and showed that it is
individually rational for a customer to participate in CCP. Moreover, we showed that this is
not the case for PCP. Indeed, PCP may even lead to missed profit opportunities and is most
beneficial to unmatched customers.
We implemented a simulation environment to numerically analyze the different pooling mech-
anisms for a real-world case study. Our results show that pooling can be beneficial from a sys-
tem, provider, and customer perspective. We show that ride-pooling may simultaneously lead
to a win-win situation for operators and customers while significantly reducing fleet emissions.
While the PCP mechanism remains very sensitive to its parameter settings, a CCP mechanism
reveals a more stable behavior. In general, a CCP mechanism (partially) Pareto dominates its
PCP counterpart. Further, assuming that a CCP mechanism yields a slightly higher percentage
of customers that participate in pooling, a CCP mechanism is always preferable for the fleet
operator from a profit maximization perspective.
The benefits of CCP mechanisms discussed in this paper open the field or further research. As
natural next steps, one may focus on efficient algorithmic implementations to make the algorithm
usable in practice, empirical field experiments to verify the impact of a CCP mechanism, or
methodologically linking the proposed mechanism to general surge pricing strategies.
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Appendix A Proofs
Proof 1 (Proof of Theorem 1.) Let i be a customer. Let cS(i) and cS(j) be the total cost
of customers i, j when they are not pooled. Due to Equation (3), the two customers are pooled
if and only if the total cost when pooling, cCC(i, j) is lower than cS(i) + cS(j). Further, the
CC pooling mechanism always assigns a payment to i such that the resulting costs c(i) < cS(i).
Hence, customers never regret being pooled. On the other hand, whenever a poolable customer
takes a solitary ride, she does not incur any additional costs compared to the scenario where
she did not set herself poolable. Hence, setting oneself poolable is individually rational. 
Proof 2 (Proof of Corollary 1.) Consider customer i. The MSP is bound by the CC pooling
mechanism to only pool i when her individual total cost decreases. No action of other customers
(e.g., lying about their attributes) can lead to a situation where setting herself not poolable would
lead to higher individual costs for i than when setting herself poolable. Therefore, setting herself
poolable is a weakly dominant strategy. 
Proof 3 (Proof of Theorem 2) Let i be a customer with value of time vi that requests a trip
from oi to di. Taking a solitary ride, the MSP would charge a price of pS(i) = pf + pv(oi, di)
with arrival time at td,Si . Hence, the total cost of i for a solitary ride sum up to cS(i) =




. Given a discount factor δ and a detour factor ∆, the total cost of i when




. Setting herself poolable
ceases to be individual rational when
vi >
(1− δ) · pS(i)
∆ · (td,Si − toi )
.
Hence, customers with high values of time might be better of not setting themselves poolable. 
Proof 4 (Proof of Theorem 3.) Consider two poolable customers i and j with the same
value of time. Assume a PC pooling mechanism with a fixed discount factor of δ and an arrival
time guarantee such that the duration of i and j’s trips when pooled is at most by a factor
(1 + ∆) longer than if they would travel alone.
Let customer i requests a ride from location li to location lD. At the same time, customer
j requests a ride from lj to lD (thus they both share the same destination location). Let distab
denote the distance between locations la and lb and let tab be the travel time between the respective
locations. Assume that there are two vehicles, one at li and one at lj, which both could pick up
i and j immediately. Let travel times and distances be such that distiD = distjD, tiD = tjD,
and tij = ∆ · tiD. Hence, tij + tjD = (1 + ∆)tiD = (1 + ∆)tjD, i.e., pooling i and j is allowed.
Further, let distances be such that distij < distiD (i.e., pooling i and j is profitable for the MSP
since both customers receive a discount regardless of pooling and hence maximizing the MSPs
profit is equivalent to minimizing the total driving distance).
Slightly alter i’s and j’s origin location to l̃i and lj̃, such that t̃ij̃ = tij and dist̃ij̃ = distij,
but tj̃D = tjD− εt = tiD− εt for some small εt > 0, distj̃D = distjD− εd for some small εd > 0,








tiD + ε tiD − ε
∆ · tiD
(i) (ii)
Figure 7.: Example where the PC mechanism fails: While both customers would be pooled in (i), they
would not be pooled in the (ii). If there was a profitable pooling opportunity in (ii), customers
would not be pooled. If pooling is not profitable in (ii) it would also not be profitable in (i), even
though customers are pooled within the PC mechanism.
In the following, we show that either pooling is profitable for all participants with the original
and the altered locations, or it is unprofitable for customers in both scenarios.
Assume first that pooling with the altered origin destination would be profitable for both
customers in a CC pooling mechanism as compared to taking solitary rides. Pooling is no
longer allowed in PC due to the arrival time guarantee since t̃ij̃ + tj̃D > (1 + ∆)tj̃D, even
though it is profitable for customers and the MSP due to dist̃ij̃ + distj̃D < distij + distjD and
dist̃iD + distj̃D = distiD + distjD. Therefore, the PC mechanism misses a profitable pooling
opportunity in this case.
Now, assume that the pooling with the altered origin and destination would not be profitable
for both customers in any CC or PC pooling mechanism. Then, it can also not be profitable
with the initial origin locations. The sum of total costs for solitary rides is the same in both
instances. However, the pooled ride’s total cost is lower with the altered locations due to lower
distance and time. Hence, if pooling is not profitable for customers in the altered instance, it
cannot be profitable in the original instances. The customers are pooled in the original instance’s
PCP mechanism, even though it is unprofitable for them. 
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